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Non-Financial Disclosure and Market-Based Firm Performance: The Initiation of
Financial Inclusion
Abstract
We examine the association between financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance in
Bangladeshi banks from 2009 to 2014 in response to a regulatory directive on the
engagement of banking firms in financial inclusion activities. We find a positive association
between financial inclusion disclosure and banking firms’ subsequent performance, with this
relationship moderated by market competition and government ownership. We also find
evidence that firms’ engagement in financial inclusion activities increases their market share,
with the disclosure of this information reducing the information asymmetry between
managers and capital market participants. The broad implication of our research findings is
that firms considering investing in financial inclusion activities could benefit from improved
firm performance and gain market share. The research findings contribute to the larger debate
on the reasons why firms should consider incorporating these initiatives into their operational
activities. In addition, the findings inform various international organisations that promote
financial inclusion activities.
Keywords: Financial inclusion disclosure, Banking industry, Firm performance, Emerging
economy, Stakeholder theory
JEL classification: G21, M14, M41, M48
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1. Introduction
During the last two decades, the business world has witnessed a proliferation of nonfinancial disclosures (e.g., environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosures). In many
countries, some of these disclosures are mandated. For example, in 2014, the European
Commission mandated some aspects of social disclosures for certain large listed firms, with
500 or more employees, operating in the European Union’s 28 states (European Commission,
2014). Recently, significant pressure has been exerted on the financial sector for engagement
with and disclosure of a particular type of information known as financial inclusion.1 Nearly
two and a half billion people do not currently use financial services, and more than
50 per cent of adults in the poorest households throughout the world are unbanked (World
Bank, 2014). As a result, financial inclusion has emerged as an important issue on the global
policy agenda for sustainable development (Allen et al., 2016).2
It is argued that financial inclusion directly contributes to the economic development of a
country (Allen et al., 2016; World Bank, 2014) and that it ensures the efficient allocation of
productive resources, thereby reducing the cost of capital (Sarma and Pais, 2011). Several
central banks, in both developing and developed countries, have introduced initiatives
through engaging their banking sectors to promote financial inclusion in their countries
(World Bank, 2014).3 Consequently, banking firms have allocated a substantial amount of
resources to engage in financial inclusion activities and have communicated this information
1

Financial inclusion is defined as the course of action that ensures access to, and availability and usage of,
formal financial services by all individuals and firms in an economy (Allen et al., 2016; World Bank, 2014).
2
Eccles and Serafeim (2013) argue that sustainability reporting, including reporting on green programs (e.g.,
using energy-efficient light bulbs, operating from a platinum-rated Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) building, climate change deniers and saving water), is not material when it comes to financial
industry firms showing their commitment to sustainability. Instead, social and governance issues and how they
relate to their performance are crucial. The authors argue that financial inclusion is one of the most important
indicators of social performance for showing the commitment by financial firms to sustainability.
3
Financial regulators, the government and the banking industry play pivotal roles in financial inclusion-related
policy issues. In addition to initiatives by central banks, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of Twenty (G20), the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) and
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) together are playing an active role at the international level in
setting standards to improve financial inclusion.
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to various stakeholders including government regulators. Although financial inclusion
disclosure can be viewed as part of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures (Eccles
and Serafeim, 2013; European Commission, 2001, 2008), it is a new type of non-financial
disclosure that has a direct impact on the firm’s market-based performance.4 The reason is
that a commitment to financial inclusion includes providing financing/credit facilities to the
unbanked population in society through reduced interest rates, even if this is not in line with
the firm’s business strategy. However, consistent with the resource-based view of the firm,
investment by firms in maintaining effective stakeholder relationships through financial
inclusion activities should lead to improved firm performance (Hillman and Keim, 2001;
Choi and Wang, 2009).5 Furthermore, the accounting profession has an important role in
financial inclusion disclosure as the profession is responsible for the measurement and
disclosure of this information (Huang and Watson, 2015). Surprisingly, no research on this
new type of social responsibility disclosure was evidenced in the accounting literature. This
presents the context for the current study.
In the present study, we investigate a potential gap by examining the impact of the
disclosure of firm-level financial inclusion activities on firms’ market-based performance in
an emerging economy, using the context of Bangladesh. We choose an emerging economy as
the importance of financial inclusion is more apparent in emerging and developing economies
(World Bank, 2014) in terms of meeting the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs).6 Bangladesh is chosen as the context for our study as the government of Bangladesh

4

The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (1998, p.3) defines ‘corporate social
responsibility (CSR)’ as “the continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the
local community and society at large”. Financial inclusion is linked with economic development through
improvement of the community and society at large.
5
Investments in stakeholder relations may lead to customer or supplier loyalty, reduced employee turnover or
improved firm reputation (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009).
6
The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targeted developing countries, more
specifically, the poorest, while the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) apply to the entire world regardless
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has undertaken various initiatives to support the country’s inclusive growth and poverty
reduction goals (Belal and Cooper, 2011), with these initiatives aligned with global visions,
such as the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNCTAD, 2014). For
example, as a forerunner, the central bank of Bangladesh (Bangladesh Bank) issued a
directive in 2008 for all banks operating in Bangladesh to engage in financial inclusion
activities and to disclose information on such activities in their reporting to the central bank
and in their annual reports. Therefore, the Bangladeshi banking sector was one of the first in
the world to issue this type of regulatory directive to foster financial inclusion activities.
Moreover, the central bank of Bangladesh argues that contributions to financial inclusion
activities will provide long-term competitive advantage for banks in Bangladesh (Bangladesh
Bank, 2008). This supports the argument that financial inclusion should not be considered
merely as the social activities of a firm but should rather be used as a strategic tool to
improve overall firm performance. Whether firms’ engagement in financial inclusion
activities has any impact on their performance is yet to be understood—with regard to both
developed and developing countries. These points motivate us to examine the impact of
financial inclusion activities on firms’ performance. Moreover, firms operating in highly
competitive industries are continuously compelled to outperform their peers (Sun and Stuebs,
2013). Firms with a higher level of government ownership may also experience influence on
their financial inclusion activities and disclosure as financial inclusion is a priority policy
issue for the government of Bangladesh (World Bank, 2014). Considering these points, we
examine the moderating roles of market competition and government ownership in the
relationship between firm performance and financial inclusion. We also examine the potential
benefits that firms can obtain through engaging in financial inclusion activities. Furthermore,
the regulatory directive in Bangladesh regarding engagement in financial inclusion activities
of whether a country is rich or poor.
<http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment>.

Details
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presented an exogenous shock to banking firms, thus offering an excellent experimental
setting. This reduces the potential for endogeneity bias that is often present in studies
examining the relationship between firm performance and financial inclusion activities’
disclosure.
Using a sample of 161 banking firm-year observations from 2009 to 2014, we analyse the
impact of the disclosure of financial inclusion activities on banking firms’ future performance
and examine the moderating roles of market competition and government ownership on this
relationship. We create a financial inclusion disclosure index comprising 13 items for
quantifying financial inclusion disclosure based on the central bank of Bangladesh’s
directive. To address simultaneity bias, three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression is applied.
We apply lead–lag and two-stage regression approaches to address endogeneity. In the first
stage of the two-stage regression, financial inclusion disclosures are regressed on several firm
characteristics. The residuals from the first-stage regression are then used as an independent
variable in the second-stage regression as a proxy for financial inclusion disclosure. The
residuals are considered to be exogenous as they are not determined by firm-specific factors
(Gul et al., 2011). To address selection bias, we apply Heckman’s (1979) two-stage
regression.
As indicated in our results, banking firms with higher levels of financial inclusion
activities are more likely to subsequently have improved firm performance. In other words,
banking firms undertaking financial inclusion activities can benefit from improved firm
performance. The relationship between financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance is
found to be moderated by both market competition and government ownership. We also show
that firms with higher levels of financial inclusion activities are more likely to have higher
market share and face lower information asymmetry. Our findings are robust to a number of
statistical tests.
6

This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, to the best of our
knowledge, this study is the first to explore the impact of financial inclusion activities and
disclosures on firm performance. Consequently, our study extends the disclosure literature in
accounting by examining a new type of disclosure that enhances the future performance of
banking firms. Our financial inclusion disclosure index covers a wide array of information;
thus, it can be applied to assess financial inclusion activities in other emerging economies.
Secondly, our findings are important for firms considering investment in financial inclusion
activities as we document that firms could benefit from their improved performance and gain
market share through the reduction of information asymmetry in the market. In addition, our
study’s findings contribute to the larger debate by providing reasons why banking firms
should consider incorporating these initiatives in their operational activities. The findings also
inform country-level regulators and the various international organisations that promote
financial inclusion activities (e.g., the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Group of Twenty (G20), the Alliance for Financial
Inclusion (AFI), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the World Bank).
Thirdly, our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the role of corporate
governance elements and firm-specific control variables in financial inclusion disclosure, an
area in which only limited empirical evidence is available. Finally, in the study, we focus on
bank-specific social activities’ research. Therefore, our study responds to the call by Beurden
and Gossling (2008) for industry-specific research on firms’ social activities to advance the
usefulness of CSR research. Thus, this study also adds to the CSR literature on the banking
industry.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the research
context and the institutional background to financial inclusion in Bangladesh. Section 3
presents the theoretical framework, the literature review and hypotheses development.
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Section 4 explains the research design of the study. Section 5 provides and discusses the
empirical results, while Section 6 explains the sensitivity analyses. The final section
concludes the paper.
2. Financial inclusion and research context
2.1 Conceptualisation of the term ‘financial inclusion’ and the necessity for financial
inclusion by banks
An increasing body of evidence shows the strong nexus between financial development
and economic growth (Beck et al., 2007, 2008) where it is stated that financial development,
through the inclusion of financial services for all people in a country, leads to sustainable
economic growth. The reason is that an inclusive financial system ensures the efficient
allocation of productive resources through the provision of formal financial services to all
citizens including those who are disadvantaged and marginalised. Such a system comprises a
platform that educates and stimulates savings and re-investment in many small business
initiatives (Gardeva and Rhyne, 2011). Furthermore, this system not only improves the
welfare of individuals and households that are poor, but it also reduces their reliance on
informal sources of credit (e.g., money lenders) which, as evidence shows, are often
exploitative (Sarma and Pais, 2011). Given that an absence of financial inclusion is
considered as a barrier to economic development, an all-inclusive financial services system is
instrumental for sustainable economic development in any economy irrespective of its
developed or emerging status (Beck et al., 2008; Allen et al., 2016). Against this backdrop, a
recent report by the World Bank (2016) disclosed that more than 38 per cent of adults
worldwide do not use financial services owing to the costs and travel distances: among this
proportion of the world’s population, nearly half are households in developing countries.
Conceptually, financial inclusion is defined by the Center for Financial Inclusion (CFI)
(2009, p.4) as “a state in which all people have access to a suite of quality financial services,
8

provided at affordable prices, in a convenient manner, and with dignity for the clients”. At a
minimum, it encompasses savings, credit, insurance and payments to facilitate economic
transactions, improve the quality of life, manage day-to-day resources, protect against
vulnerability, make productivity-enhancing investments and build economic citizenship
(Center for Financial Inclusion (CFI), 2009). Financial inclusion adds benefits to society and
the economy as a whole. For example, it has been argued that access to basic financial
services can make a considerable positive difference in improving poor people’s lives in
terms of increasing their savings, enabling them to know how to trade-off between
consumption and wealth creation, increasing productive investment and consumption, and
empowering poor women (Ardic et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2016). Moreover, access to finance
is the main barrier to growth for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Beck et al.,
2008; Ardic et al., 2011). To illustrate, with access to micro-credit, farmers can invest in
greater quantities of farm inputs for crop production or more diverse livestock, or an artisan
can acquire more raw materials. As a result, financial inclusion has gradually been positioned
as the core priority of the international development agenda for development agencies, and as
the development goal for policy makers and at the national level (Ardic et al., 2011). Policy
makers in both developed and developing countries have also increasingly recognised that a
financial services market that reaches all citizens enables more effective implementation of
social policies and development priorities (Beck et al., 2008).
Over recent decades, evidence has shown that different types of financial service
providers, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), commercial banks, credit card
companies, and cooperative and community-based development organisations, have unveiled
new possibilities for financially excluded people (World Bank, 2016). For example, in a
report prepared by the World Bank, it was stated that more than 50 national-level policymaking and regulatory bodies publicly provided a commitment to support financial inclusion
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strategies for their countries during 2013 (World Bank, 2014). Although this issue has
attracted the attention of academic researchers, to date, evidence has mainly been reported in
the economics literature (for a review, see Burgess and Pande, 2003; Kempson et al., 2004;
Beck et al., 2007, 2008; Sarma and Pais, 2011; Allen et al., 2016). Whether commercial
banks are adequately engaging and disclosing their financial inclusion initiatives is an
important question, the answer to which is yet to be known in the accounting literature.
2.2 Bangladesh as the research context: The central bank’s initiatives on financial inclusion
for the banking industry
Bangladesh, a British colony for approximately 200 years, is now considered an emerging
economy in South Asia. The country shares many institutional features of an emerging
economy including: the weak rule of law (Khan, 2003); lack of accountability and
transparency (Khan, 2003); and government intervention in business activities (Muttakin et
al., 2015). Notwithstanding these issues and considering its strong economic rise and its
increasingly active role in the world economy (Goldman Sachs, 2011), Bangladesh has been
placed among the “Next Eleven (N-11)” emerging economies and is considered to be one of
the global growth-generating countries. Bangladesh has recorded impressive growth and
consistent economic development by attaining an annual gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rate of more than 6 per cent over the last 10 years, even during the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC), and aspires to be a middle-income country by its 50th birthday in 2021 (World
Bank, 2015). Recently, The Guardian (2012), noting Bangladesh’s continuous and
sustainable economic development, predicted that Bangladesh, along with another 10
countries that were termed “new wave countries” might overtake the West by 2050. This
progress could largely be attributed to Bangladesh’s growing and export-leading industries,
its human capital and, above all, its banking institutions, which serve as the lynchpin in
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capital mobilisation.7 Furthermore, the above-mentioned institutional differences make
Bangladesh unique in comparison to other developing countries.
Banking firms’ engagement in financial inclusion activities is not mandatory under the
existing laws in Bangladesh. Firms can voluntarily engage in such activities and disclose this
information. While the adoption of financial inclusion activities is not mandatory, the central
bank of Bangladesh considers it to be an additional dimension for assessing a banking firm’s
management performance (Bangladesh Bank, 2008). Thus, it is expected that the issuance of
the 2008 directive would positively influence Bangladeshi banking firms to undertake
financial inclusion activities, and that firms with higher levels of engagement in these
activities would benefit from both the activities and the additional disclosures. However, to
date, no research has been conducted to examine the benefits to firms disclosing information
on financial inclusion activities. This situation motivates us to conduct the present study.
3. Theoretical framework, literature review and hypotheses development
Stakeholder theory explains how organisations respond to the demands of their
stakeholders to obtain competitive advantage and survival in society (Hill and Jones, 1992).
Banks typically provide services to people who can afford them; therefore, the unbanked
population does not have access to banking products and services. This creates a social
problem: in addition, servicing this group of people could be costly for banks. However, the
demand of the unbanked population for these products and services categorises this group as
potential customers and an important stakeholder group. Freeman (2010) defines a
stakeholder as any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the
firm’s objectives. The unbanked population can be significantly positively affected by the
7

The financial system in Bangladesh is mainly controlled by the banking sector with approximately 95 per cent
of the financial system’s assets under the banking sector’s control (Bose et al., 2017a). Furthermore, as of
31 December 2014, banking firms represented approximately 15.35 per cent of total market capitalisation and
approximately 70 per cent of the total market capitalisation of the financial institutions of the Dhaka Stock
Exchange (DSE), with this being the highest percentage of all other sectors except the telecommunications
sector (Dhaka Stock Exchange, 2015).
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products and services offered by banks. For example, a farmer, if provided with a lowinterest loan facility (a loan which they otherwise could not afford), is likely be interested in
borrowing money to invest in their business.
Firms may focus on the needs of their primary and powerful stakeholders, but their
success in doing so is likely to depend on whether they are meeting the needs of other
stakeholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Moreover, an implicit social contract exists between
the firm and those who are affected by its operations (Brown and Deegan, 1998). A social
contract thus exists between financial institutions and the unbanked population. Through
banks designing the right products and services to meet the needs of the unbanked population
can have a profound impact on their lives. In addition, the unbanked population accounts for
a major part of Bangladeshi society, and these individuals have implicit claims on banks
whose products and services can be of significant benefit to them. According to stakeholder
theory, firms that serve the implicit claims of stakeholders enhance company reputation and
positively affect firm performance (Freeman, 2010). Several studies have concluded that
firms, through stakeholder management, can maintain good relations with stakeholders who
are viewed as valuable which, in turn, facilitates firms in gaining and sustaining performance
advantage (Hillman and Keim, 2001; Choi and Wang, 2009). Therefore, this study is drawn
upon stakeholder theory.
The increasing awareness of financial inclusion activities across the world has led to
increased demands from stakeholders, including international organisations and government
regulators, for firms to provide additional information about their current activities and future
strategies to engage in financial inclusion activities. However, to date, very little is known
about the engagement of firms in financial inclusion activities, disclosures of these activities
and the impact of these disclosures on firms’ performance. The concept of financial inclusion
activities falls under the broad definition of CSR-related activities (European Commission,
12

2001; Bangladesh Bank, 2008; Eccles and Serafeim, 2013); therefore, we chose to focus on
the relationship between firm performance and CSR disclosures for this study’s literature
review.
Many studies in the accounting literature have examined the relationship between CSR
disclosures and contemporaneous economic performance; however, these studies have
documented mixed results and have focused on environmental disclosures (Saha and Bose,
2017). For example, de Villiers and van Staden (2011) document that economic performance
is negatively associated with environmental disclosures reported in the annual report using
return on assets (ROA) as a measure of economic performance, while Plumlee et al. (2015)
find that the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures is associated with firm value
through both cash flow and cost of equity components. Choi et al. (2010), based on their
study of Korean firms, show a positive and significant relationship between corporate
financial performance and a stakeholder-weighted CSR index. In addition, Cahan et al.
(2016) find that unexpected CSR disclosure is positively related to firm value, with Tobin’s
Q used for measurement.
Financial inclusion is a broad concept that includes: providing financing support to SMEs;
financing programs to support farming and co-production activities; providing low-cost or
free bank accounts; having a reduced initial deposit and/or low ongoing deposit maintenance
requirements; supporting mobile banking activities, etc. These financial inclusion activities
are analogous to social activities for the banking firms involved in their facilitation to
maintain good relationships with stakeholders. The traditional view of the firm conjectures
that firms exist solely to serve the interests of their shareholders through maximising
economic efficiency (Friedman, 1970). However, a ‘social contract’ exists between the firm
and the society, as the firm’s business is operated within that society. Firms should therefore
take into account not only the rights of their investors but also the rights of people within the
13

society in which they operate. Consequently, a growing number of stakeholders, including
the government, have recognised that the engagement of firms in financial inclusion activities
is an appropriate and legitimate corporate activity. Furthermore, when governments are
constrained through insufficient resources to support the deprived members of society and
social welfare projects, business contributions are considered legitimate and appreciated
(Dickson, 2003; Wang and Qian, 2011).
Government regulators promote the engagement of the private sector in supporting
financial inclusion as it reduces the extent of the governmental burden. Thus, firms can use
financial inclusion activities as a strategic move to achieve socio-political legitimacy, with
this realised when the government or the general public, including powerful stakeholders,
recognises that a firm is acting appropriately and correctly in terms of existing norms and
laws (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Wang and Qian, 2011). However, gaining the acceptance of
stakeholders and the government does not have a direct influence on the financial
consequences of financial inclusion activities. The reason is that some key stakeholders, as
well as government bodies, control the resources that are critical to the continued viability
and success of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). A firm’s activities can have an
important impact on the firm’s performance if they help to address the concerns of the firm’s
powerful stakeholders, including the government (Frooman, 1999; Wang and Qian, 2011). A
firm’s contributions to social causes send signals to government bodies that corporate
managers are sincere in dealing with their stakeholders (Wang and Qian, 2011). Similarly, a
firm’s initiatives to address stakeholders’ demands can be translated into a market position
for the firm (Stanwick and Stanwick, 2013) which supports the achievement of superior
performance. Firms’ engagement in financial inclusion activities facilitates both the
fulfilment of the government’s inclusive growth and poverty reduction goals and the
satisfaction of the demands of other stakeholders. Therefore, we propose that the engagement
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of a firm in financial inclusion activities and the disclosure of these activities would influence
a firm’s performance. Hence, we hypothesise that:
H1: Disclosure of financial inclusion activities is positively associated with firm
performance.
Nevertheless, the relationship between financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance
can be influenced by various contingency conditions (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Sun and
Stuebs, 2013). Studies have argued that the relationship between a firm’s social activities and
its performance might be influenced as a result of the industry-specific context (e.g., market
competition) (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Sun and Stuebs, 2013). Recent research has
indicated that, in a competitive industry, a lower level of involvement in social activity
programs, such as financial inclusion initiatives, relative to that of competitors and/or the
industry, has a negative effect on a firm’s performance (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Sun and
Stuebs, 2013). This view is consistent with stakeholder theory. As discussed earlier, to be
successful and to cope with external competitive challenges, firms must focus on the needs of
powerful stakeholders as well as those of other stakeholders. A banking firm’s involvement
and participation in many social activities to achieve financial inclusion and the disclosure of
these activities are an effective way for the firm’s managers to improve the firm’s community
engagement, image, promotion and branding of banking services (Porter and Kramer, 2006).
Furthermore, when faced with an environment of stiff market competition, firms will have a
tendency to maximise shareholder value by participating in social and community activities
to gain competitive advantage by signalling to the market that they not only take care of
shareholders’ value but also community well-being. Given that not all firms in an industry
engage at the same level in financial inclusion activities, these activities not only serve as the
mechanism for disclosing to external stakeholders the firm’s care for the community, but also
enable the firm to be better positioned than its competitors, resulting in increasing its
15

customer base, community reputation and market share (Porter and Kramer, 2011). Today,
external stakeholders demand that, in addition to their goal of profits, businesses should be
responsible to their employees, their communities, their societies and to other stakeholders,
even if this involvement requires them to sacrifice some profits (Carroll and Buchholtz,
2014).8 Firms also incur different direct costs (e.g., costs associated with initiating, managing
and reporting financial inclusion activities) and indirect costs (e.g., the opportunity cost of
forgoing margins on some products to promote financial inclusion) in producing and
disclosing information on financial inclusion activities to their stakeholders. Top executives
ultimately bear the responsibility of assessing the impact of firms’ social activities on the
bottom line (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). Therefore, in a strongly competitive business
environment, decision makers basically build up a business case that participation in social
activities is consistent with the firm’s long-term social performance goal that ensures
sustainable and solid financial outcomes for shareholders (Porter and Kramer, 2006).
In the context of the banking industry in Bangladesh, it is often argued that commercial
banks in Bangladesh perform ‘rich people’ banking rather than ‘mass people’ banking
leaving marginalised and poor people unattended by banking services. Nevertheless,
commercial banks now compete to attract new customers with micro-credit institutions
(MCIs) and other small cooperatives as these firms provide similar deposit and credit services
to marginalised people and those at the grass roots. Therefore, under financial inclusion
programs, commercial banks in Bangladesh now commonly provide banking services to
marginalised people in order to compete with MCIs as well as enhancing their own social and
community performance. In terms of financial inclusion activities in their social programs,

8

These sacrificed profits can be attributed in many ways such as: providing financing/credit facilities to the
marginalised population in society through reduced interest rates; providing banking services to regions that are
economically unviable from banks’ perspectives, but where these services are beneficial for the broader
community as a whole; financing an indigenous handicraft business’s community at a subsidised rate;
maintaining a quota system; financing at a special rate to poor women and those who are disadvantaged when
financing small and medium-sized loans; etc.
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banks are continuously pressed to outperform their peers. As a result, they are more likely to
engage in social activities that could bring not only future benefits by increasing their
customer base, community engagement and reputation resulting in increased market share,
but also to disseminate details of this performance by its disclosure in their annual reports. On
the basis of the above-mentioned arguments and drawing on stakeholder theory, we
hypothesise the moderating role of an industry-specific factor, that is, market competition in
the relationship between financial inclusion activities’ disclosure and firm performance.
Specifically, the fit (or the lack thereof) between disclosures of banks’ financial inclusion
activities and market competition is expected to have an effect on banks’ performance.
Hence, we hypothesise that:
H2: Market competition moderates the relationship between disclosure of financial
inclusion activities and firm performance.
Furthermore, government-linked firms are publicly visible as their activities are more
apparent to society; therefore, there is a stronger public expectation that government-linked
firms will be more conscious of their responsibilities (Ghazali, 2007; Bose et al., 2017b). The
goal of the government’s initiatives in financial inclusion activities is to improve the level of
well-being in society through ensuring all-inclusive growth and poverty reduction programs
by taking banking services to the grass-roots level. Government-linked firms experience
pressures from society to engage in activities, such as financial inclusion because, through
their links to the government, a body trusted by the public, they are required to fulfil its
stakeholders’ demands and the public’s expectations. In the context of voluntary disclosure,
Eng and Mak (2003) document that government ownership is positively associated with
increased voluntary disclosures. Both Ghazali (2007) and Bose et al. (2017b) provide
evidence of the positive and significant impact of government ownership on firms’ social
activities.
17

As mentioned earlier, globally more than 50 per cent of adults in the poorest households
are unbanked (World Bank, 2014). These people receive their deposit and lending services
through alternative channels, such as MCIs, local cooperatives and other cash-converter
houses (CGAP, 2017). In the case of Bangladesh, over 60 per cent of the population is yet to
access mainstream banking services (World Bank, 2014). In this regard, many MCIs and
cooperative associations provide alternative banking and credit facilities to poor and
marginalised people. However, in countries with a large population overall, such as
Bangladesh, MCIs and cooperatives are not adequate to serve the large population of
unbanked people/poor people. Therefore, the government has recently undertaken initiatives
with the intention that commercial banks take the lead in financial inclusion services in which
marginalised and disadvantaged people will be considered to be under the purview of
banking services. At the same time, banks linked to the government or in which the
government has a stake are now more inclined to take massive initiatives to implement
financial inclusion activities because, the government, on top of its financial goal, has
revitalised banks’ targets to achieve social goals. Therefore, it is expected that firms with a
government stake will play a pioneering role in meeting the government’s aspirations through
engaging in financial inclusion activities that will also influence privately-owned firms. On
the basis of the above-mentioned arguments, we examine the moderating role of government
ownership in the relationship between financial inclusion activities’ disclosure and firm
performance. Hence, we hypothesise that:
H3: Government ownership moderates the relationship between disclosure of financial
inclusion activities and firm performance.
Figure 1 summarises the hypothesised relationships.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
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4. Research design
4.1 Sample and data
Our initial sample includes all banking firms in Bangladesh from 2008 to 2014. We
selected 2008 as the initial study year due to the issuance of the directive by the central bank
of Bangladesh regarding banking firms’ engagement in financial inclusion activities, and the
final study year, 2014, as it was the most recent year with available data. The banking
industry in Bangladesh included 349 banking firm-year observations from 2008 to 2014.9
However, we dropped 139 observations as the firms were not listed on the stock exchanges.10
We also excluded 19 observations as a result of missing stock market data. Due to our lead–
lag analysis approach, we excluded 30 observations, as we required one-year-ahead firm
performance information. The firm performance data therefore covered the period from 2009
to 2014, while independent variables applied to the period from 2008 to 2013. The final
sample includes 30 unique banking firms with 161 banking firm-year observations. Appendix
A provides the list of the sample banking firms. Financial inclusion data were collected from
the banking firms’ annual reports. We collected information on accounting and share market
data from the Compustat Global database and corporate governance data from annual reports.
The annual reports were also utilised to supplement missing accounting information or
information not covered by the Compustat Global database.
4.2 Empirical models and variable definitions
Endogeneity and self-selection issues can affect the relationship between financial
inclusion activities’ disclosure and firm performance. To address these concerns, we follow
the lead–lag approach in our regression models. Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicts that financial

9

Currently, 56 banking firms are operating in Bangladesh, 30 of which are listed on the stock exchanges.
The two stock exchanges in Bangladesh are the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) and the Chittagong Stock
Exchange (CSE).

10
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inclusion activities’ disclosure leads to better firm performance. We test H1 by estimating the
following regression model:
TOBINQi,t+1 = β0 + β1FIIi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LIQUIDITYi,t + β6FAGEi,t
+ β7FOREIGNi,t + β8RISKi,t + β9LNCPAYi,t + β10GROWTHi,t + β11HHIi,t
+ β12GOVOWNi,t + β13INSTOWNi,t + ∑YEARi,t + εi,t

(1)

For testing H2, we include the interaction between financial inclusion activities’ disclosure
and market competition (HHI) in Equation (1).11 The model is as follows:
TOBINQi,t+1 = β0 + β1FIIi,t + β2FIIi,t×HHIi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5ROAi,t
+ β6LIQUIDITYi,t + β7FAGEi,t + β8FOREIGNi,t + β9RISKi,t + β10LNCPAYi,t
+ β11GROWTHi,t + β12HHIi,t + β13GOVOWNi,t + β14INSTOWNi,t + ∑YEARi,t
(2)

+ εi,t

For testing H3, we include the interaction between financial inclusion activities’ disclosure
and government ownership (GOVOWN), measured by the percentage of shareholdings by the
government in Equation (1). The model is as follows:
TOBINQi,t+1 = β0 + β1FIIi,t + β2FIIi,t×GOVOWNi,t + β3SIZEi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5ROAi,t
+ β6LIQUIDITYi,t + β7FAGEi,t + β8FOREIGNi,t + β9RISKi,t + β10LNCPAYi,t
+ β11GROWTHi,t + β12HHIi,t + β13GOVOWNi,t + β14INSTOWNi,t + ∑YEARi,t +
(3)

εi,t

where TOBINQ is defined as the book value of total assets plus the market value of equity
minus the book value of equity divided by total assets (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). To
measure the firm’s performance, we use the market-based measure, Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ), as
the firm’s internal measure of performance can be a source of potential endogeneity (Masulis
and Reza, 2015; Bose et al., 2017a). The advantage of focusing on a market-based measure,
such as Tobin’s Q, is that endogeneity concerns are less problematic as changes in the share
price (which is a key input to Tobin’s Q) reflect investors’ reactions and are forward looking

11

Market competition is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) multiplied by -1 with higher
values indicating greater competition.
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(Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006; Cahan et al., 2016). However, Tobin’s Q may be biased due to
potential measurement error. Therefore, following Ferreira and Matos (2008), we use the
natural logarithm of TOBINQ and -1/TOBINQ to address the potential measurement error
associated with Tobin’s Q. In addition, we use the ratio of loan defaults to total loans
(DEFAULT_LOAN) and the proportion of loan write-offs to total loans (DWO) as another
proxy for firm performance, with this discussed in Section 6 in the sensitivity analyses.12 The
financial inclusion disclosure index (FII) is measured by the percentage of financial inclusion
items disclosed by a firm.
We include a number of control variables based on prior research. Larger firms are more
inclined to make heavy investments and often receive preferential treatment which may
increase their performance (Muttakin et al., 2015). Thus, the impact of firm size (SIZE) on
performance could be either positive or negative. Leverage (LEV) affects agency costs and
thus influences firm performance (Roll et al., 2009); therefore, we control for leverage (LEV).
We control for a firm’s profitability (ROA) as firms with higher profitability may have more
favourable investment opportunities which may lead to improved firm performance (Roll et
al., 2009). A firm’s liquidity is positively associated with firm performance (Roll et al.,
2009). We, therefore, control for a firm’s liquidity in the model (LIQUIDITY). A firm’s age
may affect its financial performance because a long presence in the market helps a firm to
achieve competitive advantage (Wang et al., 2008). Consequently, we control for firm age
(FAGE). Foreign investors play a monitoring role which influences the performance of a firm
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Thus, we control for ownership by foreign investors (FOREIGN).
Adams et al. (2009) find that firm risk is negatively associated with firm performance. Hence,
we control for firm risk (RISK). Carpenter and Sanders (2002) document that the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO)’s total pay is positively associated with firm performance. Hence,
12
We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of the ratio of default loans to total loans and the
proportion of loan write-offs to total loans as a proxy for firm performance.
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we control for the CEO’s total pay (LNCPAY). We control for sales growth (GROWTH) due
to its influence on firm performance (Bose et al., 2017a). Domestic institutional ownership
negatively affects firm performance in emerging markets due to information problems,
imperfect contract enforcement, the inability to enforce property rights and flawed regulatory
structures (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). Consequently, we control for institutional ownership
(INSTOWN) in the regression model. Furthermore, we note that in prior studies all of the
control variables have been shown to affect a firm’s social activities. This provides another
rationale for controlling for their potential impact in our regression models. We also control
for year effects in all of our regression models. Table 1 provides the description of each
variable.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We apply the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression method to estimate all our models.
In these models, all t-statistics are corrected using the Huber–White procedure. The potential
for multicollinearity is diagnosed with variance inflation factor (VIF) obtained using
collinearity diagnostics after running each regression. A significant positive coefficient (β1)
on FII in Equation (1) is expected if the main hypothesis (H1) is supported. To test the
moderating hypotheses, H2 and H3, we analyse the coefficient (β2) on the interaction of FII
and HHI in Equation (2) and the coefficient (β2) on the interaction of FII and GOVOWN in
Equation (3).
4.3 Financial inclusion disclosure index
We developed an index of disclosure comprising 13 items of information based on the
central bank of Bangladesh’s directive for quantifying financial inclusion disclosure. This
ensures the validity and reliability of the research index (Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015).13

13
A disclosure index based on information voluntarily disclosed by firms is considered to have lower reliability
as managers tend to focus only on areas that fulfil their needs rather than having a genuine desire for
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Appendix B provides the list of items included in the financial inclusion disclosure index. We
utilise the content analysis technique to quantify financial inclusion disclosure from banking
firms’ annual reports, with this technique widely used in the disclosure literature (e.g.,
Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015). Furthermore, we use an unweighted approach for this
study.14 We apply a dichotomous procedure to measure financial inclusion disclosure. A
banking firm is awarded a score of 1 if an item is reported in the annual report and 0 if not.
The total financial inclusion disclosure index score is then captured for each sample banking
firm as a ratio of the total disclosure score, scaled by the maximum possible disclosure score
for the firm, with this then expressed as a percentage. A higher value in the financial
inclusion disclosure index (FII) implies a higher level of financial inclusion activities as
multiple occurrences of information relating to financial inclusion activities are captured.
In addition, following prior disclosure index studies (Gul and Leung, 2004; Bose et al.,
2017b)15, we use Cronbach’s alpha coefficient to assess the internal consistency of our
financial inclusion disclosure index. The alpha coefficient of our disclosure index is 0.838,
indicating that the items included in the disclosure index capture the same underlying
construct.16

accountability (Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015). In contrast, a disclosure index based on regulatory guidance
is considered more reliable (Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015).
14
The extant literature on disclosure studies suggests that either a weighted or an unweighted approach can be
adopted to quantify the disclosure (Cooke, 1989; Tauringana and Chithambo, 2015). The advantage of an
unweighted approach is that each item of disclosure is considered equally as important as the others, and no
greater importance is given to any particular user group (Cooke, 1989).
15
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient measures the degree to which the correlation among the items in the disclosure
index is attenuated due to random measurement error (Gul and Leung, 2004). An alpha of 0.7–0.8 indicates that,
in general, the correlation is attenuated very little by random measurement error (Gul and Leung, 2004).
16
Bose et al. (2017b) report an alpha coefficient of 0.776 for their green banking disclosure index. Furthermore,
to ensure reliability in the data coding, two coders, including one of the authors, completed the content analysis
of each annual report independently. For example, the first coder reviewed the entire sample of a banking firm’s
annual reports and performed the coding process. The second coder then compared the coded data. All
disagreements between the coders were ultimately solved through re-analysing the annual reports.
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5. Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The mean of the
financial inclusion index (FII) score is 0.302 which implies that banks have engaged and
disclosed, on average, 30.20 per cent of the financial inclusion activities listed in our index.
The average (median) performance of our sample banking firms, as measured by TOBINQ, is
1.092 (1.050). The average (median) size of our sample firms, as measured by the natural
logarithm of total assets, is 11.468 (11.525), implying average total assets of Bangladeshi
taka (BDT) 118,435 million (US$1,518.40 million) which is higher than the firm size
reported by Khan et al. (2012). The mean (median) value of leverage is 0.929 (0.917). This
higher-level leverage ratio is not surprising, as banking firms are highly leveraged. The mean
(median) value of profitability, as measured by the return on assets (ROA), is 1.20 (1.30) per
cent. The mean value of liquidity (LIQUIDITY) is 0.042 whereas the natural logarithm of the
age of banking firms (FAGE) is 2.762. The mean foreign ownership (FOREIGN) is 2.50 per
cent. The mean risk (RISK) of our sample banking firms is 1.079, and the natural logarithm of
the CEO’s pay (LNCPAY) is 2.228. The mean value of growth (GROWTH) is 0.248.
Furthermore, the average market competition (HHI) is -0.042. The government ownership
(GOVOWN) is 2.50 per cent, which is closer to the average of 3.60 per cent reported by Bose
et al. (2017b). The mean percentage of institutional investors’ ownership (INSTOWN) is
13.60, which is closer to the 13.20 per cent reported by Bose et al. (2017a). The mean value
of growth opportunity (GOP) is 2.009, implying that our sample firms’ future growth
opportunities are higher. The average audit committee size (ACSIZE) and board size (BSIZE)
of our sample firms, as measured by the natural logarithm of the total audit committee size
and board size, are 1.273 and 2.612, respectively, implying the average audit committee size
of 3.66 directors and average board size of 14.36 directors. The average percentage of female
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directors on the board (FEMDIR) is 11.50. The average percentage of independent members
on the board (BIND) and audit committee (ACIND) is 7.40 and 21.71, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 presents the correlations between the independent variables. The results show that
there are no high correlations among all the independent variables except for between SIZE
and HHI which is 0.618. Hair et al. (2010) suggest that correlations between variables below
0.90 do not create any multicollinearity problems. Hence, the correlation between SIZE and
HHI is considered to have less impact on the overall result. We also examine the variance
inflation factors (VIFs) in our models to further test for multicollinearity. The VIFs also
reveal no sign of potential multicollinearity. This is confirmed by running collinearity tests
after regression. The mean VIF of the variables in our firm performance model is 2.61. The
VIF is considered high if it is greater than 10 (Greene, 2008). The lowest VIF for all variables
in our firm performance models is 1.18, and the highest VIF is 4.91, suggesting that
multicollinearity problems are unlikely in our regression models.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
5.2 Regression analysis results
Table 4 reports the regression results of our study’s firm performance model. In Table 4,
Model 2 (Equation [1]), the coefficient of financial inclusion disclosure (FII) is positive and
statistically significant (β=0.053, p<0.05), supporting a positive relationship between
financial inclusion disclosure (FII) and subsequent firm performance. This suggests that
banking firms with a higher level of financial inclusion activities have higher performance in
the subsequent year; thus, the main hypothesis (H1) is supported. This finding is also in line
with stakeholder theory which asserts that firms’ investment in stakeholder relations, in terms
of financial inclusion, leads to higher firm performance. We next report the regression results
of H2 in Table 4, Model 3. The coefficient of FII is positive and significant (β=1.214,
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p<0.05) while the coefficient of HHI is negative and significant (β=-42.234, p<0.01). In
contrast, we document that the coefficient of FII×HHI is positive and weakly significant
(β=28.803, p<0.10). Although the level of significance is weak, it provides evidence that
while higher market competition reduces firm performance, it has a positive effect on the
performance of firms with higher levels of financial inclusion disclosure. In other words, the
effect of financial inclusion disclosure on a firm’s performance is greater for firms facing
higher market competition. This finding is not surprising as higher market competition
influences firms to engage in and disclose more social activities, including financial inclusion
activities, to outperform their peers. Thus, H2 is also supported. Next, we report the
regression results of H3 in Table 4, Model 4. We find that the coefficient of FII is positive
and significant (β=0.045, p<0.05) and that the coefficient of GOVOWN is negative and
significant (β=-0.305, p<0.01). In contrast, as expected, the coefficient of FII×GOVOWN is
positive and statistically significant (β=0.336, p<0.05) which is consistent with H3. These
results indicate that, while government ownership generally decreases firm performance, it
has a positive impact on the performance of firms with a higher level of disclosure of
financial inclusion activities. The results also suggest that when the government has
prioritised the policy issue of financial inclusion, firms with a higher level of government
ownership are more likely to promote financial inclusion activities that enhance their
performance.17
As shown in Table 4 and as indicated by the results of control variables from Models 1
to 4, firm size (SIZE) and institutional ownership (INSTOWN) are negatively associated with
firm performance, whereas leverage (LEV) and firm age (FAGE) are positively associated
with firm performance. While the coefficients of most control variables are consistent with
17

Our sample includes one state-owned bank, Rupali Bank Ltd. In Bangladesh, state-owned banks are criticised
due to their higher amount of default loans. In our main analysis, we included this bank. However, for assessing
the robustness of our main findings, we excluded this bank from our analysis. The unreported results indicate
that the tenor of our findings did not change due to the exclusion of Rupali Bank Ltd.
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our expectations, the negative coefficient of SIZE contradicts our expectations but is
consistent with the findings of Bose et al. (2017a). Perhaps the reason for the negative
relationship between firm size and firm performance is the substitution effect of the
disclosure of financial inclusion activities with firm size; that is, firms with financial
inclusion activities are larger, as reported by Bose et al. (2017a).
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The explanatory power (R2) of the model with financial inclusion (FII) (Table 4, Model 2)
is 89.70 per cent. To evaluate the incremental contribution of financial inclusion (FII) to the
explanatory power of our main regression model (Table 4, Model 2), we follow Gujarati
(2003) by repeating our main regression model (Table 4, Model 2), after excluding the main
research variable, FII. The results from this regression are reported in Table 4, Model 1,
indicating that the explanatory power of the regression model decreases to 89.30 per cent. We
then compute the F-statistic, following Gujarati (2003), using the R2 statistics reported for the
regressions with and without FII to test the null hypothesis that the inclusion of FII as an
explanatory variable does not affect the explanatory power (R2) of our main regression
model. Gujarati’s (2003) F-statistic is 4.99 and significant at 5 per cent, as reported in
Table 4, indicating that FII significantly increases the explanatory power (R2) of our main
regression model. This suggests that a firm’s disclosure of financial inclusion activities has an
incremental role in assessing the firm’s performance.
The OLS regression results of the analysis of the disclosure of financial inclusion activities
and bank performance may, however, be biased due to potential simultaneity. While more
financial inclusion activities create better relationships with key stakeholders that may help
improve overall operations, banks with superior performance may have slack resources that
allow them to devote more resources to increase their financial inclusion activities (Waddock
and Graves, 1997). As a result, the relationship between firm performance and financial
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inclusion activities may have a simultaneity bias. We address this concern using two
equations. In the first equation, we develop a model based on the determinants of financial
inclusion activities’ disclosure.18 In the second equation, we use Equations (1), (2) and (3),
respectively, and then estimate two equations in a simultaneous equations framework using
three-stage least squares (3SLS) analysis with Table 5 reporting the results. The results show
that the relationship still holds after considering the simultaneous relationship between the
level of a firm’s financial inclusion activities and firm performance.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Overall, we find evidence consistent with H1 that the degree of financial inclusion
activities is positively associated with firm performance; with H2 that the relationship
between financial inclusion activities and firm performance is moderated by market
competition; and with H3 that the relationship between financial inclusion activities and firm
performance is moderated by government ownership.
5.3. Additional analysis
This section provides evidence of the benefits which, arguably, firms may enjoy through
investing in financial inclusion activities. Specifically, we focus on two types of benefit:
increased market share and reduced information asymmetry as both attributes contribute to
increasing the banking firm’s performance.
5.3.1 Financial inclusion disclosure and market share
In the market, firms struggle to increase even a small percentage of their market share.
Corporate managers are more likely to be encouraged to invest in social activities given that
their firm’s social record increases market share (Owen and Scherer, 1993) which
18

We use firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), profitability (ROA), liquidity (LIQUIDITY), firm age (FAGE),
growth opportunities (GOP), audit committee size (ACSIZE), audit committee independence (ACIND), board
size (BSIZE), board independence (BIND) and female directors (FEMDIR) as determinants of the firm’s
financial inclusion activities. We follow the extant literature on CSR to discover the determinants of financial
inclusion disclosure (Khan et al., 2012; Bose et al., 2017b). The descriptions of these latter variables are
presented in Table 1.
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consequently contributes to increased firm performance. Prior studies document that
customers consider a firm’s social activities when making their purchase decisions (e.g., Luo
and Bhattacharya, 2006; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Extending this argument, we examine
whether banking firms’ financial inclusion activities increase market share. We use the
following model to test the association between market share and financial inclusion
activities’ disclosure:
MKTSHAREi,t+1 = β0 + β1FIIi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5LIQUIDITYi,t
+ β6FAGEi,t + β7FOREIGNi,t + β8GOPi,t + β9RISKi,t + β10GOVOWNi,t
+ β11SPREADi,t + ∑YEARi,t + εi,t

(4)

where MKTSHARE is the market share of banking firms which is computed based on total
revenue. All other variables are as described in Section 4.2.19 Table 6, Model 1, presents the
regression results. The coefficient of financial inclusion disclosure (FII) is positively
significant with market share, implying that the disclosure of financial inclusion activities
positively influences the banking firm’s market share. The control variables in Table 6,
Model 1, when significant, have the predicted signs. Overall, a firm’s disclosure of financial
inclusion activities increases the firm’s market share through attracting customers,
consequently contributing to better firm performance.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
5.3.2 Financial inclusion disclosure and information asymmetry
Voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry between informed and uninformed
investors (Bushman and Smith, 2001). In a voluntary disclosure setting, firms have discretion
in choosing what to disclose based on their needs. However, regulators reduce the
information gap between informed and uninformed investors through creating disclosure
requirements (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Prior to the central bank of Bangladesh’s directive in
19
We also run the correlation matrix for the market share model. The unreported results show that the model has
no multicollinearity concerns.
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2008, some investors were better informed than others about financial inclusion activities due
to lower information acquisition costs. This signalled a higher level of information
asymmetry in the market. However, increased disclosure may facilitate the reduction of the
information gap for uninformed investors relative to more informed investors. Consequently,
we examine whether financial inclusion disclosure reduces information asymmetry in the
market, based on the following model:
SPREADi,t+1 = β0 + β1FIIi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4LIQUIDITYi,t + β5LNPRICEi,t
(5)

+ β6PROAi,t + ∑YEARi,t + εi,t

where SPREAD is the annual average of the daily closing bid–ask spread as a percentage of
the daily closing price. We used two measures of SPREAD: SPREAD1 is the annual average
of the daily closing bid–ask spread as a percentage of the daily closing price, following Ali et
al. (2007); and SPREAD2 is the yearly median of the daily quoted spreads, measured at the
end of each trading day as the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the
midpoint annual average of the daily closing bid–ask spread as a percentage of the daily
closing price, following Daske et al. (2008). SIZE and LIQUIDITY are included in the model
as larger firms and those whose shares are more frequently traded in the market have less
information asymmetry (Ali et al., 2007). We also control for share price (LNPRICE) as
fixed-order costs are spread across more dollars in stocks that have a higher price:
consequently, the percentage spread is lower for these stocks (Ali et al., 2007). LNPRICE is
the natural logarithm of the banking firm’s stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.
Finally, we control for ROA and PROA to control for the effects of profitability on
information asymmetry. PROA is the average of the previous five (5) years’ earnings before
extraordinary items divided by the average of the previous five (5) years’ total assets, while
ROA is described in Section 4.2.20

20
We also run the correlation matrix for the information asymmetry model. The unreported results show that the
model has no multicollinearity concerns.
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Table 6, Models 2 and 3, present the regression results. The coefficient of financial
inclusion disclosure (FII) is negatively significant in both information asymmetry proxies,
implying that the disclosure of financial inclusion activities reduces a firm’s information
asymmetry. This supports the prediction that regulators’ pressure, in terms of additional
disclosure requirements, reduces information asymmetry in the market. The control variables
in Table 6, Models 2 and 3, when significant, have the predicted signs. Overall, a firm’s
disclosure of financial inclusion activities reduces information asymmetry in the market,
consequently contributing to better firm performance.
6. Sensitivity analyses
We test the robustness of our results using a number of additional analyses. Firstly, in our
firm performance model, we use different proxies for firm performance. Tobin’s Q may be a
biased performance measure due to potential measurement error; therefore, to address this
concern, following Ferreira and Matos (2008), we replace Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) with the
natural logarithm of TOBINQ and -1/TOBINQ. Our unreported results remain qualitatively
similar to those reported in Table 4. As our sample focuses on banking firms, we use the ratio
of loan defaults to total loans as another alternative proxy for firm performance. As expected,
the unreported results show that the disclosure of financial inclusion activities is negatively
associated with a firm’s default loans. This indicates that firms with a higher level of
financial inclusion disclosure are more likely to have a lesser amount of loan defaults. This
implies that firms with a higher level of financial inclusion activities are more socially
responsible, resulting in a higher loan recovery rate. For this reason, the loan default ratio of
these firms is lower. In relation to our moderating hypotheses, as expected, we find that
government ownership negatively moderates the relationship between firm performance and
financial inclusion disclosure. However, H2, which hypothesised the moderating role of
market competition in the relationship between financial inclusion disclosure and firm
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performance, is not supported. We document a positive but weakly significant coefficient of
FII×HHI which contradicts our main findings. It is possible that market competition
influences banking firms to generate a higher amount of default loans through encouraging
loans to non-viable sectors. Consequently, in the presence of higher market competition,
financial inclusion activities are unable to improve a firm’s default loan conditions.
Furthermore, we use another proxy for firm performance which is the proportion of loan
write-offs to total loans. Using this alternative proxy, we document support only for H3.
Secondly, endogeneity and self-selection bias could affect our results in the firm
performance model. We use a lead–lag approach in our main research models to control the
endogeneity issues (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). In addition, we employ two-stage regression that
also addresses endogeneity. In the first stage, we estimate the determinants of financial
inclusion activities’ disclosure. The residuals from this first-stage regression (FII_RESID) are
used as the independent variable in our second-stage regression models, namely,
Equations (1), (2) and (3), respectively. The residuals are considered as exogenous as they are
not determined by firm-specific factors (Gul et al., 2011). To estimate the first stage, we use
the same variables mentioned in Footnote 18. The unreported results from the second stage
indicate: a positive and significant coefficient of the residuals of FII_RESID in Equation (1);
a negative and significant coefficient of the interaction term of FII_RESID×HHI in
Equation (2); and a positive and significant coefficient of FII_RESID×GOVOWN in
Equation (3). These results suggest that our findings remain robust after controlling for
endogeneity bias in our analysis.
Although many banking firms in Bangladesh now disclose financial inclusion activities in
their annual reports due to perceived pressure from the central bank, some firms still do not
disclose any information, with this possibly creating self-selection bias. In our third
additional analysis, to address self-selection bias, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage
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regression approach. In the first stage, we model the determinants of disclosure decisions
about financial inclusion activities using a probit regression. In the second stage, we run an
OLS regression of firm performance on financial inclusion activities’ disclosure while
including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), derived from the first-stage regression, and other
control variables. For the first-stage regression, our dependent variable is a dummy variable
for whether firms disclose financial inclusion activities (FII_DUM) in their annual report. In
the first stage, the independent variables are: the industry average financial inclusion
activities’ disclosure score (FII_IND); firm size (SIZE); leverage (LEV); profitability (ROA);
liquidity (LIQUIDITY); firm age (FAGE); growth opportunities (GOP); female directors
(FEMDIR); board size (BSIZE); board independence (BIND); audit committee size (ACSIZE);
and audit committee independence (ACIND). We compute the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from
this stage and include it as an additional control variable in our second-stage OLS regression
models. The inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is used in the second-stage model to control for sample
selection bias. We use a banking industry average of financial inclusion activities’ disclosure
scores (FII_IND) in the first-stage model as an exclusion restriction, arguing that industry
pressure to engage in financial inclusion activities may influence the current year’s financial
inclusion activities (FII_DUM), but it does not influence the subsequent year’s firm
performance. We also test the strength of FII_IND by partial correlation, with a value of
12.46 per cent and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Therefore, FII_IND serves
as an appropriate exclusion restriction in performing Heckman’s (1979) procedure. Our
second-stage OLS models are Equations (1), (2) and (3) but with the inclusion of IMR as a
new variable. As our untabulated test results show, sample selection bias does not
qualitatively affect our main results.
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7. Conclusion
In this study, we examine the association between financial inclusion disclosure and firm
performance using the setting of an emerging economy, the case of Bangladesh. We find that
disclosure of financial inclusion activities is positively associated with firm performance, and
that this positive association is moderated by market competition as well as government
ownership. In addition, we find that banking firms’ engagement in financial inclusion
activities increases their market share and reduces information asymmetry in the market.
Given that financial inclusion activities contribute to enhancing firm performance, this result
suggests that increasing market share and reducing information asymmetry act as a
mechanism that contributes to increasing firm performance. Our study contributes to the
literature on the firm performance effects of non-financial information based on banking
industry-specific financial inclusion disclosure. Furthermore, the results of our study show
that bank managers should be informed about the overall effects of their engagement in
financial inclusion activities. Shareholders, analysts and investment managers should
understand that firm performance is affected by a firm’s financial inclusion disclosures. The
findings of our study also contribute to the larger debate on the reasons why banking firms
should consider incorporating these initiatives in their operational activities. Furthermore, our
findings inform country-level regulators and various international organisations that promote
financial inclusion activities about the benefits of firm-level financial inclusion activities.
Like all research, this study has some limitations. Firstly, our financial inclusion disclosure
index only captures the government of Bangladesh’s recommended areas of financial
inclusion activities’ disclosure; however, banking firms may engage in other types of
financial inclusion activities. Secondly, although a number of determinants of financial
inclusion are included in our three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression, it is possible that we
have missed some important factors that simultaneously determine the level of financial
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inclusion activities and firm performance. Therefore, our analysis may suffer from omitted
variable bias. Thirdly, we use only stock exchange-listed banking firms, leading to a limited
sample size. Future research in this area could investigate both stock exchange-listed and
non-listed banking firms as financial inclusion activities are equally applicable to both types
of banks. Although our findings show that financial inclusion activities affect information
asymmetry and market share, future research could explore whether they affect stakeholder
sentiment.
Despite these limitations, our findings provide theoretical and empirical support for the
beneficial role of financial inclusion and add to the growing body of financial inclusion
literature that explore the benefits of banking firms’ engagement in financial inclusion
activities.
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Figure 1: Hypothesised relationships
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Table 1
Description of variables.
Notation

Variable Name

Description

TOBINQ

Firm performance

Sum of the book value of total assets plus market value of equity
minus the book value of equity divided by total assets.

FII

Financial inclusion
disclosure index

Financial inclusion disclosure scores/index.

SIZE

Firm size

Natural logarithm of total assets.

LEV

Leverage

Ratio of total debt scaled by total assets.

ROA

Profitability

Ratio of income before extraordinary items divided by total assets.

LIQUIDITY

Liquidity

Average monthly share trading volume relative to total number of
shares outstanding.

FAGE

Firm age

Natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm’s inception.

FOREIGN

Foreign exposure

Percentage of shares owned by foreign investors.

RISK

Firm risk

Market-model beta computed from daily stock returns.

LNCPAY

CEO’s pay

Natural logarithm of the total amount of payments to CEO.

GROWTH

Firm’s growth

Percentage change in annual revenue.

HHI

Market competition

Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is computed by summing the
squares of market shares of all firms in the banking industry. The
market share of a firm is computed by dividing the total amount of
revenue of a firm by the total amount of revenue of all firms in the
banking industry. We multiply HHI by -1 where higher values
indicate greater competition.

GOVOWN

Government ownership

Percentage of shareholding by the government.

INSTOWN

Institutional ownership

Percentage of shareholding by institutional investors.

GOP

Growth opportunities

Market-to-book ratio of equity.

ACSIZE

Audit committee size

Natural logarithm of the total number of members on the audit
committee.

ACIND

Audit committee
independence

Ratio of total independent members on the audit committee relative
to total members.

BSIZE

Board size

Natural logarithm of the total number of members on the board.

BIND

Board independence

Percentage of independent members on the board.

FEMDIR

Female director

Percentage of female directors to total directors on the board.

MKTSHARE

Market share

Percentage of market share based on total revenue.

SPREAD

Information asymmetry

Annual average of the daily closing bid–ask spread as a percentage
of daily closing price.

LNPRICE

Share price

Natural logarithm of share price.

PROA

Prior return on assets

Average of prior 5 years’ earnings before extraordinary items
divided by the average of prior 5 years’ total assets.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Median

FII

161

0.302

0.275

0.308

TOBINQ

161

1.092

0.163

1.050

SIZE

161

11.468

0.598

11.525

LEV

161

0.929

0.095

0.917

ROA

161

0.012

0.015

0.013

LIQUIDITY

161

0.042

0.064

0.006

FAGE

161

2.762

0.398

2.708

FOREIGN

161

0.025

0.081

0.000

RISK

161

1.079

0.362

1.048

LNCPAY

161

2.228

0.382

2.315

GROWTH

161

0.248

0.160

0.237

HHI

161

-0.042

-0.001

-0.041

GOVOWN

161

0.025

0.119

0.000

INSTOWN

161

0.136

0.119

0.135

GOP

161

2.009

1.545

1.795

ACSIZE

161

1.273

0.223

1.099

ACIND

161

0.217

0.172

0.250

BSIZE

161

2.612

0.335

2.639

BIND

161

0.074

0.076

0.067

FEMDIR

161

0.115

0.125

0.091

MKTSHARE

161

0.034

0.016

0.031

SPREAD

160

0.032

0.006

0.032

LNPRICE

161

4.712

1.626

4.202

PROA

115

0.011

0.017

0.014

This table reports the descriptive statistics of all variables included in our research models. N represents the number of
observations. Std. Dev. is the standard deviation. All variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 3
Pearson’s correlation matrix.
FII

SIZE

LEV

ROA

LIQUIDITY

FAGE

FOREIGN

RISK

LNCPAY

GROWTH

HHI

GOVOWN

FII

1.000

SIZE

0.402***

1.000

LEV

-0.059

-0.271***

1.000

ROA

-0.034

0.305***

-0.533***

1.000

LIQUIDITY

-0.345***

-0.361***

-0.156**

0.186***

1.000

FAGE

-0.034

0.444***

0.081

-0.138**

-0.089

1.000

FOREIGN

-0.117

-0.125*

0.239***

-0.452***

-0.034

0.071

1.000

RISK

-0.271***

-0.118*

-0.119*

0.230***

0.189***

-0.006

-0.008

1.000

LNCPAY

0.164**

0.368***

-0.118*

0.029

-0.319***

0.122*

0.023

-0.081

1.000

GROWTH

-0.204***

-0.036

-0.194***

0.233***

0.191***

-0.227***

-0.007

0.216***

0.069

1.000

HHI

0.538***

0.618***

0.012

-0.023

-0.480***

0.293***

-0.129**

-0.199***

0.525***

-0.300***

1.000

GOVOWN

-0.050

0.061

-0.050

-0.067

-0.019

0.263***

-0.070

0.124*

-0.529***

-0.070

-0.038

1.000

INSTOWN

0.195***

-0.036

0.105

-0.039

-0.174**

-0.032

0.004

-0.149**

0.059

-0.239***

0.065

-0.237***

INSTOWN

VIF
2.17
3.95
4.91
4.68
2.00
1.82
1.27
2.60
2.21

This table reports the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the firm performance model’s explanatory variables. All variables are defined in Table 1.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
* Significance at the 10% level.

44

1.45
4.46
1.78
1.000

1.18

Table 4
OLS regression results of financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance.
Variable

Pred.
Sign

FII

Model 1

+

FII×HHI

?

FII×GOVOWN

?

SIZE

?

LEV

+

ROA

+

LIQUIDITY

+

FAGE

+

FOREIGN

+

RISK

-

LNCPAY

+

GROWTH

+

HHI

?

GOVOWN

?

INSTOWN

-

Constant

?

Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
Adj. R2
F
Gujarati’s (2003) ∆R2-F-statistic

Dependent Variable = TOBINQ

-0.047***
(-2.838)
1.072***
(9.198)
-1.009
(-1.233)
-0.006
(-0.055)
0.089***
(6.128)
0.118
(1.337)
0.051
(1.384)
-0.003
(-0.179)
-0.013
(-0.413)
-28.509***
(-3.848)
-0.203**
(-2.429)
-0.070**
(-2.026)
-0.855*
(-1.724)
YES
161
0.893
0.881
102.496***

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.053**

1.241**

(2.277)

(2.018)
28.803*
(1.925)

0.045**
(2.017)

-0.053***
(-3.215)
1.086***
(9.993)
-0.871
(-1.136)
-0.029
(-0.274)
0.099***
(6.140)
0.113
(1.427)
0.057
(1.519)
0.001
(0.032)
-0.009
(-0.281)
-36.136***
(-4.206)
-0.210***
(-2.673)
-0.087**
(-2.315)
-1.186**
(-2.296)
YES
161
0.897
0.884
101.051***

-0.053***
(-3.191)
1.094***
(10.010)
-0.827
(-1.078)
-0.042
(-0.400)
0.098***
(6.007)
0.117
(1.547)
0.055
(1.501)
0.004
(0.204)
-0.011
(-0.339)
-42.234***
(-4.261)
-0.208**
(-2.591)
-0.088**
(-2.339)
-1.456**
(-2.548)
YES
161
0.898
0.885
102.236***

0.336**
(2.594)
-0.050***
(-3.008)
1.164***
(10.758)
-0.459
(-0.560)
-0.037
(-0.349)
0.098***
(6.149)
0.112
(1.388)
0.061
(1.608)
0.002
(0.130)
-0.004
(-0.133)
-36.042***
(-4.141)
-0.305***
(-4.174)
-0.083**
(-2.229)
-1.291**
(-2.471)
YES
161
0.901
0.888
78.051***

4.99**

This table presents the OLS regression results of financial inclusion disclosure on firm performance. Model 1 shows the
main regression model excluding financial inclusion disclosures, while Model 2 presents the regression model with financial
inclusion disclosures. Model 3 shows the regression model with interaction between financial inclusion disclosure and
market competition. Model 4 shows the regression model with interaction between financial inclusion disclosure and
government ownership. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Pred. sign is the predicted sign. All variables are defined
in Table 1.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
*
Significance at the 10% level.
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Table 5
Three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression results of financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance.
Pred. Sign
Variable

FII

Models (1),
(3) and (5)
+

FII×HHI

?

FII×GOVOWN

?

Models (2),
(4) and (6)
−

Dependent
Variable = FII

Dependent Variable =
TOBINQ

Dependent
Variable = FII

Dependent Variable =
TOBINQ

Dependent
Variable = FII

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

***

***

0.360
(4.033)

***

10.033
(2.673)
241.935***
(2.661)

0.376
(3.997)
0.286*
(1.885)

+

TOBINQ
SIZE

?

+

LEV

+

+

ROA

+

+

LIQUIDITY

+

+

FAGE

+

-

FOREIGN

+

RISK

-

LNCPAY

+

GROWTH

+

HHI

?

GOVOWN

?

INSTOWN

-

GOP

Dependent Variable =
TOBINQ

-0.086***
(-4.434)
1.114***
(8.812)
-0.194
(-0.244)
-0.097
(-0.787)
0.151***
(6.360)
0.063
(1.021)
0.056**

0.519**
(2.289)
0.156***
(3.341)
-0.712
(-1.593)
-3.488
(-1.608)
0.133
(0.422)
-0.246***
(-5.001)

(2.541)
0.011
(0.600)
-0.009
(-0.262)
-79.465***
(-5.250)
-0.203***
(-3.890)
-0.103**
(-2.035)
+

-0.054***
(-3.081)
1.151***
(9.177)
-0.496
(-0.654)
-0.144
(-1.163)
0.090***
(4.984)
0.151**
(2.036)
0.048**

-0.240
(-0.871)
0.127***
(2.685)
0.221
(0.446)
-2.701
(-1.210)
0.177
(0.560)
-0.181***
(-3.562)

(2.015)
0.028
(1.210)
-0.023
(-0.583)
-87.303***
(-4.023)
-0.196***
(-3.297)
-0.098**
(-2.020)
0.011

(2.718)
0.013
(0.688)
-0.007
(-0.219)
-82.636***
(-5.291)
-0.284***
(-4.428)
-0.102*
(-1.956)
0.013
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-0.087***
(-4.287)
1.182***
(8.975)
0.201
(0.247)
-0.110
(-0.871)
0.154***
(6.266)
0.058
(0.943)
0.060***

0.618***
(2.757)
0.158***
(3.404)
-0.826*
(-1.861)
-3.378
(-1.562)
0.141
(0.450)
-0.252***
(-5.112)

0.006

ACSIZE

+

ACIND

+

BSIZE

+

BIND

+

FEMDIR

+

Constant

?

Year Fixed Effects
Observations
R2
Chi2

-2.923***
(-3.847)
YES
161
0.763
812.402***

(0.783)
0.158*
(1.829)
0.067
(0.568)
-0.011
(-0.191)
-0.041
(-0.120)
-0.164
(-1.448)
-1.042
(-1.599)
YES
161
0.488
183.345***

-3.450***
(-3.334)
YES
161
0.830
868.046***

(0.763)
0.249***
(2.577)
0.107
(0.744)
-0.059
(-0.864)
-0.207
(-0.495)
-0.277**
(-2.160)
-0.913
(-1.376)
YES
161
0.526
179.209***

-3.140***
(-4.084)
YES
161
0.747
788.384***

(0.445)
0.149*
(1.744)
0.066
(0.572)
-0.006
(-0.110)
-0.038
(-0.113)
-0.140
(-1.265)
-1.057
(-1.625)
YES
161
0.482
184.472***

This table presents the three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression results of financial inclusion disclosure on firm performance. Models 2, 4 and 6 report the regression model of the
determinants of financial inclusion disclosure, while Model 1 presents the regression model of financial inclusion disclosure and firm performance. Model 3 presents the regression model with
the interaction between financial inclusion disclosure and market competition. Model 5 presents the regression model with the interaction between financial inclusion disclosure and government
ownership. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Pred. sign is the predicted sign. All variables are defined in Table 1.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
* Significance at the 10% level.
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Table 6
OLS regression results of financial inclusion disclosure, market share and information asymmetry.

Variable

Pred.
Sign

Dependent Variable =
MKTSHARE
Model 1
0.004**
(2.010)
0.038***
(25.517)
0.073***
(8.361)
-0.015
(-0.298)
0.011
(1.240)
-0.000
(-0.054)
-0.006
(-1.341)
-0.001*
(-1.765)
0.002
(0.848)
-0.019***
(-4.360)
-0.065
(-0.471)

Pred.
Sign

FII

+

SIZE

+

LEV

+

ROA

+

LIQUIDITY

+

FAGE

+

FOREIGN

+

GOP

?

RISK

+

GOVOWN

?

SPREAD

-

LNPRICE

-

-

PROA

+

?

Constant

?

Year Fixed Effects

-0.446***
(-20.467)
YES

N
R2
Adj. R2
F

161
0.929
0.922
87.603***

-

?
-

?

Dependent
Variable =
SPREAD1

Dependent
Variable =
SPREAD2

Model 2
-0.005***
(-3.198)
-0.007***
(-6.316)

Model 3
-0.005***
(-3.218)
-0.007***
(-6.187)

0.043
(0.827)
-0.016*
(-1.748)

0.047
(0.842)
-0.022**
(-2.363)

-0.001
(-0.518)
0.081
(1.311)
0.109***
(9.685)
YES

-0.001
(-0.266)
0.107
(1.613)
0.121***
(9.794)
YES

118
0.749
0.723
36.042***

118
0.780
0.757
35.392***

This table presents the OLS regression results of financial inclusion disclosure on market share and information asymmetry.
Model 1 shows the regression model of financial inclusion disclosure and market share. Models 2 and 3 report the regression
models of financial inclusion disclosure and information asymmetry. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Pred. sign
is the predicted sign. All variables are defined in Table 1.
*** Significance at the 1% level.
**
Significance at the 5% level.
* Significance at the 10% level.
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Appendix A: List of sample banks.
Name of Bank
Arab Bangladesh Bank
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd
Bank Asia Ltd
BRAC Bank Ltd
Dhaka Bank Ltd
Dutch-Bangla Bank Ltd
Eastern Bank Ltd
EXIM Bank Ltd
First Security Islami Bank Ltd
ICB Islami Bank Ltd
IFIC Bank Ltd
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd
Jamuna Bank Ltd
Mercantile Bank Ltd
Mutual Trust Bank Ltd

Name of Bank
National Bank Ltd
NCC Bank Ltd
One Bank Ltd
Premier Bank Ltd
Prime Bank Ltd
Pubali Bank Ltd
Rupali Bank Ltd
Shahjalal Bank Ltd
Social Islami Bank Ltd
Southeast Bank Ltd
Standard Bank Ltd
The City Bank Ltd
Trust Bank Ltd
United Commercial Bank Ltd
Uttara Bank Ltd
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Appendix B: Financial inclusion disclosure items.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13

Programs that support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with a particular focus on collaboration
with micro-credit institutions (MCIs) and business ideas that aim to solve a social problem.
Organisations that support the programs mentioned in item 1 and provide them with unique facilities, such as
a collateral-free loan and lower interest rates.
Financing programs for installation of biomass processing plants (e.g., biogas plants).
Financing programs for installation of solar panels in rural households.
Financing programs for waste recycling plants in locations populated by the urban poor.
Financing programs for effluent treatment plants (ETPs) in manufacturing establishments.
Financing programs to support agricultural activities (e.g., crops, oilseeds, spices, vegetables, fruits, etc.).
Financing programs to support farming activities (e.g., milk production, or fish or cattle farming) with
particular focus on co-production activities (e.g., fish/duck farming with rice of a deep-water variety in lowlying fields).
Financing programs to support traditional handicraft businesses, and folk music and performing arts activities
that are carried out with a view to income generation and employment for the population groups involved.
Additional banking facilities provided to the financial inclusion target groups (e.g., low-cost or free bank
account, school banking, reduced initial deposit and/or low ongoing deposit maintenance requirements).
Campaign to introduce the bank’s financial inclusion program. Introducing different schemes through which
microfinance is channelled to the target groups.
Incorporation of rural population in mobile banking activities with provision of any extra facilities to
encourage them to use these facilities (e.g., training program on how to use mobile banking, etc.).
Special programs in place to help remote rural households receive remittances from family members residing
overseas.
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